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Blockchain is a database of storing sequential events as a chain of blocks
consistently across a distributed set of nodes. A fundamental problem in
doing so is to decide where to put the next block and who should do it in
a Sybil-resistant manner. To solve this problem, typically, a node is elected
randomly as a leader to append a new block to the end of a chain stored
locally by the leader. Ideally, this should extend the chain of blocks, however
in practice, due to network imperfections, the local blockchain of the leader
might not be synced entirely, thus resulting in forking, a scenario when a
new block is appended in the middle of the blockchain, thus creating a fork.
These network imperfections create a structure like a tree rather than a chain,
where blocks not part of the main chain are abandoned, thus reducing the
system’s efficiency. We propose a new peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol called
Barracuda, where the leader polls ` − 1 random nodes for their blocktree
information before proposing a new block and show that this policy has an
effect equivalent to having a network that is ` times faster under a stochastic
network model inspired by Decker and Wattenhofer (2013). We also show
via simulations that Barracuda is robust to several real-world factors in the
network model.
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Blockchain can be viewed as a data structure and a distributed system. There
are a variety of blockchain data structures as construed in the works like Bit-
coin [1], Prism [2], Fruitchains [3] and Conflux [4]. Hash-chain data struc-
ture is the most widely used and hence the focus of this thesis. It is an
append-only data structure where a block appends to a previous block in a
predefined manner, hence creating a chain of blocks. This chain structure is
maintained by having each block contain a hash pointer of the previous block;
this hash-chain structure makes it difficult to modify the chain. This hash-
chain structure makes it easy to append an element to the end of a blockchain
but challenging to alter or insert elements in the middle of a blockchain since
every subsequent element must be modified to preserve validity.
The blockchain distributed system has come to mean the network and
consensus algorithms that enable a distributed set of nodes to robustly and
consistently maintain such a data structure. There are many obstacles to
maintaining a distributed blockchain in practice, including peer churn, ad-
versarial behavior, and unreliable networks. This thesis focuses on the last
challenge and considers how to build efficient blockchains over unreliable
networks. Although the research community is increasingly studying peer-
to-peer (P2P) networks in blockchain systems [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], network
effects are arguably the aspect of blockchains that has received the least at-
tention thus far with a few exceptions [9, 10]. We are particularly interested
in how the network affects blockchain performance metrics such as latency
and throughput for new data elements. To explain the problem, we start
with a brief summary on existing blockchain systems.
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1.1 Blockchain Summary
Blockchain systems are typically used to create a distributed append-only log
with additional state transition conditions on the log. For this reason, they
are typically used to track sequential events, such as financial transactions
in a cryptocurrency.
A block is simply a data structure that stores a batch of such events, along
with a hash of the previous block contents. Blockchain’s main problem is
reaching a consensus on the next block in the hash-chain data structure. This
problem is referred to as leader election; such an election is necessary since
allowing anyone to propose in a permissionless network will lead to many
proposals and subsequent denial of service attacks. Many leading cryptocur-
rencies (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Cardano, EOS, and Monero) handle this
problem by electing a proposer (leader) who is responsible for producing a
new block and broadcasting it to the network. The election happens via dis-
tributed, often randomized protocols, varying in their specifics as designed
by the system designers.
Bitcoin and Ethereum, the most popular cryptocurrencies, elect proposers
randomly with probability proportional to the computational energy they
have expended; this mechanism is called proof-of-work (PoW) and ensures
Sybil resistance since computational resources cannot be increased easily.
Under PoW, each node solves a computational puzzle; the puzzle takes a
random time to solve, with the mean of the time inversely proportional to
the computational resource allocated. On solving the puzzle, the node is
said to have mined a block and is considered a proposer. The node relays the
block over the underlying P2P network, along with the proof that it solved
the puzzle. Due to the high energy cost of solving PoW puzzles (or mining)
[11], a new paradigm recently emerged called proof-of-stake (PoS). Under
PoS, a proposer is elected with probability proportional to its stake in the
system instead of the computational power. This election process happens
at intervals with a stabilized mean.
When elected a proposer, a node must choose where to append the block
in the hash-chain. Most blockchains use a longest chain fork choice rule,
where a proposer always appends its new block at the end of the longest
chain in its local view of the block-tree. Under ideal conditions with no
network latency or no adversary, this will lead to a perfect chain. However,
2
in practice, the network has random delays, which will lead to the proposer
not having received all the blocks. In such a scenario, it will propose a
block which causes the blockchain to fork. When a node is elected proposer,
its job is to propose a new block containing a hash of the previous block’s
contents. Hence the proposer must choose where in the blockchain to append
its new block. Such forking is not fatal since, in longest-chain blockchains,
this forking is resolved with probability one because one fork eventually takes
over. (The term “fork” is similar in meaning to the term “branch” used by
many in the literature.)
Blockchains in practice are often not chains but blocktrees, since forking has
been observed in almost all significant blockchains. This forking will reduce
throughput in chain-based protocols because blocks not in the main chain
are discarded. Moreover, it also gives adversaries a distinct advantage, since
honest proposers are confused about which fork to extend. Thus, forking is
a significant obstacle to practical performance in existing blockchains. How-
ever, forking is challenging to mitigate because it ultimately arises because
of network latency and is assumed to require hardware upgrades.
There are two common approaches to mitigate forking. One is to improve
network latency by upgrading hardware. This idea has been the basis for
recent projects like the Falcon network [9] and Bloxroute [10]. The other
is to design consensus algorithms to tolerate forking and take advantage
of forked branches. Examples include GHOST [12], SPECTRE [13], and
Inclusive/Conflux [4].
Consensus-level changes are challenging to implement in already estab-
lished blockchains that hard code the consensus rules; thus, in this thesis, we
design a P2P protocol called Barracuda that effectively reduces forking for
a broad class of existing consensus algorithms.
1.2 Related Work
The literature on reducing forking can be separated into three main cate-
gories. The first is to change the consensus algorithm to embrace forking
and include forked blocks in the ledger. The second is to reduce the pro-
posers’ diversity, and the third is to resolve forking before moving to the
next block algorithmically.
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1. Embracing forking: A class of consensus algorithms has been pro-
posed that uses the forked blocktrees to increase throughput such as
GHOST [12], PHANTOM [14], SPECTRE [13], and Conflux [4]. GHOST
has a fork choice rule that tolerates honest forking by building on
the heaviest subtree instead of the longest subtree; this is described
more carefully in Section 2.2. SPECTRE, PHANTOM, and Conflux
build a directed acyclic graph (DAG); this graph includes the forked
blocks in the final ledger. The security properties of DAGs are not well
understood; moreover, such ledger construction typically leads to de-
coupling transaction validity from ordering, making light clients more
complex. A new category of consensus protocols has emerged recently
that attains consensus using structured DAGs; these consensus proto-
cols are designed to deal with concurrent blocks securely. Prism [2],
and Fruitchains [3] are a few examples of such structured DAGs. The
fundamental intuition is to run a separate ordering tree which orders all
blocks containing transactions. There can be forking on the ordering
tree; however, all transaction containing blocks are eventually included
in the ledger. Being a consensus-level solution, however, makes these
approaches unsuitable for application to existing blockchains.
2. Reducing proposer diversity: Forking is caused by the delay of
newly constructed blocks reaching the next proposer. This delay can
be prevented if the proposer remains the same for consecutive blocks.
This approach is proposed by Bitcoin-NG [15], where proposers use the
longest chain rule, but the chain is divided into epochs, and withing an
epoch, the proposer remains the same. Bitcoin-NG exhibits a few prob-
lems. First, attackers can learn the proposer’s identity since epochs are
long and launch an attack. Second, the confirmation delay increases,
since to confirm a block, it has to be extended by a threshold number
of randomly selected proposers. The idea of having a fixed proposer is
shared in many other protocols such as Thunderella [16] and ByzCoin
[17] and suffer from similar problems.
3. Fork-free consensus: Several consensus protocols have been pro-
posed recently in the literature that use a voting-based Byzantine fault
tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithm. Using a voting-based BFT al-
gorithm for every block ensures that one block is selected per level,
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and hence no forking is observed. Examples include Algorand [18, 19],
Ripple [20], and Stellar [21]. A primary concern in such protocols is
that Byzantine-fault tolerant voting protocols can be communication-
intensive and require a known set of participants, requiring some level
of efficiency and centralization.
1.3 Contributions
We have three major contributions.
1. We propose a probabilistic model for the evolution of the blocktree
in PoS cryptocurrencies, where the main source of randomness is the
network delay. This model reflects the randomness measured in a prior
work [5]. Our model differs from previous theoretical papers in the
consensus literature [22, 12] that assume a synchronous or partially-
synchronous network with known and unknown bounded delays; the
bounded delays simplifies the analysis by analyzing the worst case. We
analyze the effect of average network delay on system throughput and
provide a lower bound on the block throughput.
2. We propose a new block proposal algorithm that we call Barracuda,
under which proposers poll ` randomly-selected nodes for their local
information before proposing a block. We show that this algorithm
has approximately the same effect as if the entire network were ` times
faster for small `. This speedup is achieved without any change in
hardware.
3. We provide guidelines on how to implement Barracuda in practice to
ensure robustness against practical factors not modeled in the theoret-
ical analysis, such as network delay distribution mismatch, adversarial
behavior, etc.
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Our approach Barracuda provides a new networking protocol that many
existing consensus algorithms can benefit from and hence complements most
of the above approaches. Rather than eliminating forking, we run a round of
polling to improve the proposer’s blocktree estimate. Polling has long been
used in classical consensus protocols [23],[24],[25], as well as more recent work
specific to blockchains [26]. Our approach differs since we do not use polling
to reach consensus; rather, we use polling to reduce the number of inputs
to the consensus algorithm. Hence, Barracuda can be used as an add-on
for many consensus protocols. The material in the following chapters has
appeared in part in [27].
Chapter 2 describes the stochastic model for blocktree evolution. Chapter
3 uses this model to analyze block throughput. Chapter 4 presents the Bar-
racuda algorithm and its analysis. We end with Chapter 5 with simulations




We model blocktree evolution with two randomness sources: randomness
in the delay of transmitting messages and randomness in the timing of the
proposal of new blocks. The system parameters are the number of nodes
n, average network delay ∆, proposer waiting time ∆̃, and the number of
concurrent proposers k.
2.1 Block Generation
Block generation is a discrete-time arrival process where the tth block is gen-
erated at time γ(t). Multiple proposers can be elected at once to provide
robustness if one proposer fails. Hence at time γ(t), k nodes are chosen uni-
formly at random as proposers. The index t ∈ Z+ is a positive integer, which
we also refer to as time. The randomness in choosing proposers in indepen-
dent across time. Let (t, 1), (t, 2), . . . , (t, k) denote the k blocks generated at
time t.
Two standard block arrival processes are Poisson and deterministic.
In PoW systems like Bitcoin, the block arrivals are Poisson since they are
determined by independent attempts to solve the mining puzzle with each
attempt having a fixed probability of success, k = 1 with high probability.
Under a Poisson arrival process, γ(t)− γ(t− 1) ∼ Exp(λ) for some constant
λ, and γ(t)− γ(t− 1) is independent of {γ(i)}t−1i=1.
In many PoS systems, block arrival can be modeled as deterministic. In
some protocols (e.g., Cardano [28], Qtum [29], and Particl [30]), time is split
into discrete intervals. Some protocols give each node a fixed probability
of being chosen in the interval, leading to a geometrically distributed γ(t).
Other protocols designate one proposer per time slot (e.g., Cardano [31]);
such protocols can be modeled with a deterministic interval process, γ(t) = t,
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for all t ∈ N. If the probability of electing any proposer in a time step is close
to one, there will be at least one block proposer in each time slot with high
probability, which can be approximated by a deterministic arrival process.
Our main results apply regardless of arbitrary arrival process γ(t).
A proposer generates a block (t, i) and attaches the new block to the
existing block, which we refer to as the parent block of (t, i). The proposer
chooses this parent block according to a predetermined rule called a fork-
choice rule; we discuss this further in Section 2.1. The proposer broadcasts
a message containing the following information:
Mt,i = (Block (t, i), pointer to the parent block of (t, i))
to all the other nodes in the system. The broadcasting process is governed
by our network model, which is described in Section 2.1.
Due to subtleties in the practical implementation of Barracuda (described
in Chapter 4), we mainly focus on the setting with the PoS setting. We focus
on PoS because, in PoW, the parent block has to be decided before mining.
Suppose a proposer were to poll nodes after successfully mining and the
parent block is updated, then updated parent block may undo all the mining
process, and the proposer may no longer be the eligible proposer for that
time. However, many PoS systems allow block creation to happen after a
proposer is elected; hence, polling results can be simultaneously incorporated
into a block and broadcast to the network. Hence, Barracuda can only be
applied to PoS systems.
Global blocktree: The collection of all Mt,i forms a rooted tree, called block-
tree. Each node in the blocktree represents a block, with each directed edge
representing a parent block’s pointer. The root of the blocktree is called the
genesis block and is visible to all nodes. The blocktree grows with each new
block; moreover, since each block can only refer to one parent, the structure
remains a tree.
Definition 1 (Global tree). We define the global tree at time t, denoted as
Gt, to be a graph whose edges are described by the set.
{(Block (j, i), pointer to the parent block of (j, i))
: 1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
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with the vertices being the union of the genesis block and all the blocks indexed
as {(j, i) : 1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
Network delays and the proposer’s distributed nature creates a scenario
where a proposer might add a block before receiving all previous blocks; the
proposer looks at the local version of the blocktree and chooses a parent
block.
Local blocktree: Each node has its local version of the blocktree. Upon
receiving the message Mt,i, a node updates its local view. If the parent block
exists in the local blocktree, the incoming block is attached to it; if the parent
block does not exist in the local blocktree, Mt,i is stored in an orphan cache
until the parent block is received. Each node’s local view is a subgraph of
Gt.
2.2 Network Model
The overlay network is a complete graph, where any node can communicate
with any other node via pairwise communication. This overlay can be re-
duced to any general overlay by modeling the end-to-end delay between any
pair of nodes. We assume that the end-to-end delay is an independent expo-
nential random variable with mean ∆. Although the overlay network does
not directly correspond to the random regular structure of the Bitcoin P2P
network, the exponential delay compensates for it by capturing the dynamic
network effects of real blockchain networks, as empirically measured in [5] on
Bitcoin’s P2P network.
This exponential delay encompasses both network propagation delay and
the validation delay caused by relaying nodes on the bitcoin P2P network;
validation is necessary to protect against network layer denial-of-service at-
tacks.
We model that, when a proposer is elected to generate a new block at
time γ(t), its local blocktree information is obtained instantaneously, and
the proposer waits for time ∆̃ ∈ [0, 1) to decide on the parent block from its
local blocktree. The local fork choice rule governs the choice of the parent
block.
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2.3 Fork Choice Rule
We describe two of the most common fork choice rules: the Nakamoto pro-
tocol (longest chain) and the Greedy heaviest-observed sub-tree (GHOST)
protocol, which come under the category of local attachment protocols.
Local attachment protocols: The proposer decides the parent block solely
based on the snapshot of its local blocktree at time γ(t) + ∆̃, invariant to
the identity of the proposer. Almost all permissionless blockchains use local
attachment protocols.
Nakamoto protocol (longest chain rule): Parent block is the leaf of the
longest chain in the local blocktree. In the case of a tie, the parent block is
chosen arbitrarily. The longest chain rule is widely-used, including in Bitcoin,
ZCash, and Monero.
GHOST protocol: Parent block is the leaf of the heaviest sub-tree in the
local blocktree. The proposer starts from the genesis block and traverses the
tree toward the leaves until it reaches a leaf block. The proposer chooses
the offspring with the largest number of descendants (i.e., the heaviest sub-
tree). Ties are broken arbitrarily. A variant of the GHOST rule is used in
Ethereum.
Both Nakamoto and GHOST are local attachment protocols. We show in
Chapter 4 that our analysis generally applies to all local attachment proto-
cols. It is desirable to design protocols that maximize the expected length of
the longest chain of Gt as it will increase blockchain throughput. We define





The number of transactions that can be processed per unit of time or trans-
action throughput is vital in deciding the cryptocurrency-based payment sys-
tem’s performance limits. Since a block has an upper bound to the number of
transactions it can include, transaction throughput is closely related to block
throughput, also known as the main chain growth rate. Given a blocktree Gt,
the length of the main chain L(Gt) is defined as the number of hops from




where ∂(Gt) denotes the set of leaf blocks in Gt, and d(B0, B) denotes the hop
distance between two vertices B0 and B in Gt. We define block throughput
as limt→∞ E[L(Gt)]/t.
Block throughput describes how quickly, on average, the blocks are added
to the blockchain; if each block is full and contains only valid transactions,
then block throughput is directly proportional to transaction throughput. In
practice, this is not the case, since adversarial strategies like selfish mining
[32] can reduce the number of honest blocks and hence the number of valid
transactions per block. Hence, our work’s key objective is to quantify block
throughput, both with and without polling.
We study the block throughput without polling under the Nakamoto proto-
col. The Nakamoto protocol has been studied under a simple network model
with deterministically bounded delay in [12, 22, 2]. This simple network
model is used since it is a standard model in the distributed systems com-
munity, and the model is used to prove robustness properties like safety and
liveness under an adversary. However, in network applications, we are more
interested in the system’s average throughput than the worst-case through-
put; such a worst-case analysis is not useful when analyzing the average case
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block throughput.
We perform an average case analysis of the block throughput in the ab-
sence of any adversary and capture the effects of network delay. We ask the
fundamental question of how block throughput depends on the average net-
work delay, under a more realistic network model where each communication
realizes a random exponential variable with average delay ∆ as explained
previously in section 2.2. We provide a lower bound on the block through-
put in this following (Theorem 1), under this more nuanced network model,
and Nakamoto fork-choice rule. This result holds for a deterministic arrival
process.
Theorem 1. Suppose there is a single proposer (k = 1) at each discrete time,
γ(t) = t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, with no waiting time (∆̃ = 0). For any number of nodes










where C∆ = e
−1
∆ .
See the proof provided in Appendix A.1.
Trivially, E[LChain(Gt)]/t = 1 when there is no network delay, ∆ = 0, for
any other delay, we have: E[LChain(Gt)]/t ≤ 1. The gap between realized
block throughput and the optimal throughput of one occurs because of net-
work delays and is the focus of this work. Since proposers may not have an
up-to-date view of the blocktree due to network latency, they may append to
blocks that are not necessarily at the end of the global main chain, thereby
causing the blockchain fork. We run experiments with deterministic block
arrival process as explained in Chapter 5; the resulting plot in Figure 3.1 sug-
gests that Theorem 1 is tight when ∆  1. However, there is a substantial
gap between the desired upper bound and the realized block throughput.
We plan to develop Barracuda to reduce forking; to motivate the need
to reduce forking, it is worth analyzing conditions where there is no forking





= 1 − 1
t
, which implies
that E[LChain(Gt)] ≥ t− 1, we obtain that ∆ = Θ( 1log t). The following result
shows that if ∆ = O( 1
log t
), then LChain(Gt) = t with high probability, i.e., the
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Figure 3.1: Block throughput vs. mean network delay for an inter-block
time of one time unit.
Theorem 2. Fix a confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), k = 1, γ(t) = t. For both










then the probability of the chain Gen−1−2− . . .− t happens with probability
at least δ − o(1) as t→∞ and n t2.










then the probability of the chain Gen−1−2− . . .− t happens with probability
at most δ+o(1) as t→∞. Here  ignores the dependence on the parameter
δ, which is fixed throughout.
See the proof provided in Appendix A.2.
As an example, let us set ∆ = 0.017, ∆̃ = 0, and δ = 0.01. Then Eq. (3.2)
implies that for t & 5 blocks, forking occurs with high probability. Hence,
forking occurs even if we have near-ideal network conditions. To this end,




We propose `-Barracuda, which works as follows: upon arrival of a block (t, i),
the proposer of block (t, i) selects ` − 1 nodes in the network uniformly at
random and inquires about these nodes’ local tree. The proposer aggregates
the information from the `−1 other nodes and decides where to attach block
(t, i) based on the local attachment protocol it follows. We observe that there
is no conflict between the local trees of each node, so the Barracuda strategy
merges ` local trees into a single tree with the union of all the edges in the
local trees that are polled. Note that we poll ` − 1 nodes, such that a total
` local trees contribute, as the proposer’s local tree also contributes to the
union. This lack of conflict simplifies our analysis and also makes our protocol
robust to any adversary.
The polling requests are assumed to arrive at the polled nodes instanta-
neously, and it takes the proposer node time ∆̃ to decide on where to attach
the block. Zero polling delay assumption simplifies our analysis; however, we
also simulate cases with non zero polling delay in Section 5.1. To simplify the
analysis, we also assume that the information a node obtains from polling
at time t is forgotten at time t′ > t + ∆̃, i.e., no storage of polling requests.
This modeling choice simplifies the analysis; it results in a lower bound on
the improvements due to polling since nodes discard the information.
We define events on the probabilistic model of block arrival and block
tree growth. We denote X ∼ Exp(λ) an exponential random variable with
probability density function pX(t) = λe
−λt
1(t ≥ 0), and define set [m] ,
{1, 2, . . . ,m} for any integer m ≥ 1. For a message
Mj,i = (Block (j, i), point to the parent block of (j, i)),
denote its arrival time to node m as R(j,i),m. If m is the proposer of block
(j, i), then R(j,i),m = γ(j) + ∆̃. If m is not the proposer of block (j, i), then
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R(j,i),m = γ(j) + ∆̃ + B(j,i),m, where B(j,i),m ∼ Exp(1/∆). By our network
delay assumptions, B(j,i),m are mutually independent for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤
i ≤ k, 1 ≤ m ≤ n. We also denote the proposer of block (j, i) as m(j,i). To
denote polled nodes, we also write m(j,i) as m
(1)
(j,i), and denote the other `− 1




(j,i), . . . ,m
(`)
(j,i).
When block (j, i) is being proposed, we define the following random vari-
ables. Let random variable
ej,i,l,r =

1 if by the time (j, i) was proposed, node
m
(l)
(j,i) already received block r
0 otherwise
(4.1)
Here j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [`], r ∈ {(a, b) : a ∈ [j − 1], a ∈ [k]}. For any
r = (a, b), we denote r[1] = a, r[2] = b.
We will aggregate the information from `− 1 other nodes nodes whenever
a proposer proposes; hence, we define ej,i,r = 1−
∏`
l=1(1−ej,i,l,r) as the event
that when (j, i) was proposed, at least one node m
(l)
(j,i) has received block r.
Note that when the proposer tries to propose block (j, i), it has the union
of all information from the node and ` − 1 other nodes; hence, it has the
following collection of random variables at its disposal
{ej,i,r : r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k]}. (4.2)
Let Gt denote the global tree at time γ(t)+∆̃, consisting of kt+1 blocks in-
cluding the Genesis block. We are interested in the distribution of the global
tree Gt. To illustrate how to compute a certain tree structure’s probability,
we demonstrate the computation through an example where k = 1, t = 3,
and ` = 1.
We denote ej,i,(r[1],r[2]) as ej,r[1] since for this example k = 1. The probability
of some of the configurations of G3 in Figure 4.1 A can be written as
P [G3 = Figure 4.1 A] = P (e2,1 = 1, e3,1 = 1, e3,2 = 1) ,
P [G3 = Figure 4.1 B] = P (e2,1 = 1, e3,1 = 1, e3,2 = 0) , and
P [G3 = Figure 4.1 C] = P (e2,1 = 1, e3,1 = 0) .
The event in Figure 4.1 C, is agnostic to the node m(3,1) receiving block (2, 1),
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as the parent of that block is missing in m(3,1)’s local tree. Block (2, 1) is
therefore stored in an orphan buffer, to be appended later when the parent














Figure 4.1: Example of G3 under with varying blocktree structures.
4.1 Main Result
Proposer selection and the union of ` polled blocktrees are random events.
Under any local attachment protocol C and any block arrival distribution,
the event that EC,t,g = {Gt = g} depends on the random choices of proposers
and polled nodes, {m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [`]}, the messages received at
those respective nodes, {ej,i,r : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k]},
and some additional outside randomness on the network delay and the block
arrival time. The following theorem characterizes the distribution of Gt on
the system parameters t,∆, `, ∆̃ for a general local attachment protocol C
(including the longest chain and GHOST protocols).
Theorem 3. For any local attachment protocol C and any inter-block arrival
distribution, define random variable G̃t which takes values in the set of all
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possible structures of tree Gt such that
1




∣∣{m(l)(j,i)}j∈[t],i∈[k],l∈[`] are distinct]. (4.3)
We have the following results:
(a) There exists a function F independent of all the parameters in the model
such that for any possible tree structure g,
P(G̃t = g) = F
( ∆
`
, ∆̃, g, C
)
. (4.4)










See the proof in Appendix A.3.
In Eq. (4.3), we condition on the event that all proposers and polled nodes
are distinct. This conditioning ensures that all received blocks ej,i,l,r’s at
those nodes are independent over time j. This conditioning, in turn, allows
us to capture the precise effect of ` in the main result in Eq. (4.4). Further,
the bound in Eq. (4.5) implies that such conditioning is not too far from the
actual evolution of the blockchains, as long as n  (`kt)2. In practice, n
need not be so large, as we show in Figure 4.2. Even with n = 10, 000 <
(`kt)2 = 160, 000 for 4-polling, the experiments support the predictions of
Theorem 3.
The above theorem implies that `-Barracuda effectively reduces the net-
work delay by a factor of `. For any local attachment protocol and any block
arrival process, up to a total variation distance of (`kt)2/n, the distribution
of the evolution of the blocktree with `-Barracuda is the same as the distri-
bution of the evolution of the blocktree with no polling, but with a network
that is ` times faster. We confirm this in experiments (plotted in Figure 4.2)
1The random variable G̃t is well defined, since the protocol C is assumed not to depend
the identity of the proposer of each block. Hence, the conditional expectation is identical
conditioned on each specific {m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [`]} whenever all tk` nodes in it
are distinct.
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for a choice of ∆̃ = 0, n = 10, 000, k = 1, t = 100, γ(t) = t, and the longest
chain fork choice rule. In the inset, we show the same results but scaled the
x-axis as ∆/`. As predicted by Theorem 3, the curves converge to a single
curve and are indistinguishable.
We observe from the plot that main chain length for no polling at delay
D almost same as the main chain length at delay D/l if we do l-polling. For
example, L(G100) for no polling at D = 1 is 66.58, which is almost the same
as the L(G100) for 2-polling at D = 2 (66.47), L(G100) for 3-polling at D = 3



























Figure 4.2: Comparing the average block throughput for various choices of
` confirms the theoretical prediction that `-Barracuda effectively speeds up
the network by a factor of `; all curves are indistinguishable when the
x-axis is scaled as ∆/` as shown in the inset.
Throughput deteriorates rapidly with network delay; this becomes critical
as we try to scale up PoS systems; blocks should be generated more fre-
quently, pushing network infrastructure to its limits. With polling, we can
achieve a significant speedup of the network without investing resources in
hardware upgrades. Note that we are comparing the average block through-
put in this Figure 4.2, which is the main property of interest. We make this
connection between the throughput and ` precise in the following corollary
of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. There exists a function L(∆/`, ∆̃, C) independent of all the
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parameters in the model such that∣∣∣E[LChain(Gt)]− E[L(∆
`
, ∆̃, C
) ] ∣∣∣ ≤ t(`kt)2
2n
. (4.6)
In the regime that n t3(k`)2, the expectation of the length of the longest
chain depends on the delay parameter ∆ and the polling parameter ` only
through their ratio ∆/`. Hence, the polling gain in the distribution of block-
trees is reflected in the gain in the block throughput.
4.2 Connections to the Balls-in-Bins Example
Barracuda has a distinct similarity with the well-known balls-in-bins problem
and the power of two choices. As the power of two choices is used for load
balancing across bins, the power of ` polling is used for information balancing
across proposers.
Let us consider the classic balls-in-bins example, we have t balls and t
bins, and we sequentially throw each ball into a uniformly randomly selected
bin. The maximum loaded bin has load (i.e., number of balls in that bin)
scaling as Θ (log t/log log t) [33]. The result of power of two choices states
that if every time we select ` (` ≥ 2) bins uniformly at random and throw the
ball into the least loaded bin, the maximum load enjoys an near-exponential
reduction to Θ (log log t/log `) [33].
We took inspiration from this power of two choices in load balancing while
designing Barracuda. We make this connection gradually more concrete in
the following. Consider the case when the underlying network is extremely
slow such that no broadcast of the blocks is received. When there is no
polling, each node is only aware of its local blockchain consisting of only
those blocks it generated. There is a one-to-one correspondence to the balls-
in-bins setting, as blocks (balls) arriving at each node (bin) build up a load
(local blockchain). When there are t nodes and t blocks, then it trivially
follows that the length of the longest chain scales as Θ(log t/log log t), when
there is no polling. The departure from balls-in-bins is that in blockchains,
the goal is to maximize the longest chain’s length (maximum load). This
leads to the following fundamental question in the balls-in-bins problem that
has not been addressed in the literature to the best of our knowledge.
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How much gain does the power of ` choices give for load unbalancing? If
we throw the ball into the most loaded bin among ` randomly chosen bins at
each step, how does the maximum load scale with t and `?
Theorem 4. Given t empty bins and t balls, we sequentially allocate balls to
bins as follows. We select uniformly at random ` bins for each ball and put
the ball into the maximally loaded bin among the ` chosen ones. Then, the
maximum load of the t bins after the placement of all t balls is at most
C · ` · log t
log log t
(4.7)
with probability at least 1− 1
t
, where C > 0 is a universal constant.
See the proof in Appendix A.4. The above theorem shows that the gain of
`-polling in maximizing the maximum load is linear in `. This analysis gives
a precise characterization of the gain in the throughput of `-Barracuda in
blockchains when ∆  1. This comparison is under a slightly modified
protocol where the polling happens in a bidirectional manner, such that the
local tree and the newly appended block of the proposer are also sent to the
polled nodes.
Blocktree evolution is connected to the balls-in-bins model for small-to-
moderate δ. The equivalence is as if the balls are copied and broadcasted to
all other bins over a communication network. The equivalence can no longer
be extended due to the specific data structures of blocktrees. However, we
borrow the terminology from ‘load balancing’ and refer to the effect of polling
as ‘information balancing,’ even though load balancing refers to minimizing
the maximum load, whereas information balancing refers to maximizing the
maximum load (longest chain) by balancing the information throughout the
nodes using polling. The balls-in-bins equivalence only develop an equiva-
lence with classical queuing theory; the results obtained in Section 4.1 hold
irrespective of this equivalence.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND SYSTEM ISSUES
We verify our proposed protocol’s robustness empirically under various is-
sues that might come up in a practical implementation of `-Barracuda. Our
experiment consists of n nodes connected via a network that emulates the
end-to-end delay as an exponential distribution; this model is inspired by the
Bitcoin P2P network’s measurements made in [5].
Each of the n nodes maintains a local blocktree, a subset of the global
blocktree. We use a deterministic block arrival process with γ(t) = t, i.e., we
assume a unit block arrival time, which is also termed as an epoch in this
section. This arrival time represents an upper bound on block arrivals in
real-world PoS systems, where blocks can only arrive at fixed time intervals.
At the start of arrival, t, k proposers are chosen at random, and each of these
proposers proposes a block.
When there is no polling, each proposer chooses the most eligible block
from its blocktree to be a parent to the block it is proposing, based on the
fork choice rule. In the case of `-Barracuda, the proposer sends a pull message
to ` − 1 randomly chosen nodes, and these nodes send their blocktree back
to the proposer. The proposer receives the block trees from the polled nodes
after a delay ∆̃ and updates her local blocktree by taking the union of all
received blocktrees. The same fork choice rule is applied to decide the parent
to the newly generated block. In all our experiments, we use the Nakamoto
longest chain fork choice rule. We ran our experiments for T = 100 time
epochs on a network with n = 10, 000 nodes with k = 1.
5.1 Effect of Polling Delay
In reality, there is a delay between initializing a poll request and receiving the
blocktree information. We expect polling delay to be smaller than the P2P
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relay network delay because polling communication is point-to-point rather
than occurring through the P2P relay network. To understand the effects of
polling delay, we ran simulations in which a proposer polls `−1 nodes at the
time of proposal, and each piece of polled information arrives after time ∆̃1,
∆̃2, .., ∆̃`−1 ∼ Exp( 10.1 ∆). The proposer determines the pointer of the new
block when all polled messages are received. Figure 5.1 shows the effect of
such polling delay, as measured by ∆0.8(`), the largest delay ∆ that achieves










Under this model, polling more nodes means waiting for more responses. The
gain of polling is less in terms of average throughput, as polling more nodes
incurs more polling delays. The gains of polling hence saturate for large-
enough `, and there is an appropriate practical choice of ` that depends on














Figure 5.1: ∆0.8(`) captures the highest delay ∆ that achieves a desired
block throughput of 0.8 under `-Barracuda. With a polling delay of
Exp(1/(0.1∆)), the performance saturates after ` = 6 and eventually
deteriorates at large `.
There is a strategy to get a large polling gain in practice, even with delays:
the proposer polls many nodes but only waits a fixed amount of time before
making a decision. Under this protocol, polling more nodes can only help; the
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only cost of polling is the communication cost. The results of our experiments
under this protocol are illustrated in Figure 5.2 (‘no setup delay’ curve).
The existence of polling delay implies a gap in our model, which does
not fully account for the practical cost of polling. To account for polling
costs, we make the model more realistic by assigning a small and constant
delay of 0.01∆ to set up a connection with a polling node and assume that the
connection setup occurs sequentially for `−1 nodes. The proposer follows the
same strategy as above: waiting for a fixed amount of time before deciding.
















Figure 5.2: Average delay ∆0.8(`) that achieves desired block throughput
0.8, when `-Barracuda is used. We assume there is a polling delay of
Exp(1/(0.1∆)), but the proposer waits exactly ∆̃ = 0.1∆ time before
proposing. When there is no setup delay, polling more nodes is always
better. Otherwise, we see an optimal `, which depends on all system
parameters.
5.2 Heterogeneous Networks
We have discussed `-Barracuda in the context of a homogeneous network:
all the nodes in the network have the same bandwidth and processing speeds.
Further statistically identical exponential random variables capture the in-
dividual variation in end-to-end delay due to network traffic. In practice,
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heterogeneity is natural (some nodes have more robust network capabilities);
we model this by clustering the nodes into h different groups, based on their
average network speed. The speed of the slower node determines the speed
of a connection between two nodes. The analysis of such a network is com-
plicated theoretically; thus, we simulate the system to see if polling is useful
in such networks. We compare the performance of `-Barracuda with that of
no polling (which has worse performance and serves as a lower bound). We
follow the following uniform polling strategy: Let the delay ∆ of a node be
a part of the set D = {∆1,∆2, ..,∆h}; a node’s delay is defined as follows:
the average delay of transmitting a block across the P2P network from node
with delay ∆i to a node with delay ∆j is max(∆i,∆j) ∀i ∈ [h].
Figure 5.3 shows the performance of a heterogeneous network with h = 2:
half of the nodes have delay ∆, and the other half have delay 5∆. Every
node has the same proposer election probability. `-Barracuda gives a gain
in the network throughput in line with the prediction of Theorem 3, even


























Figure 5.3: In a heterogeneous network, we enjoy the same polling gain as
in a homogeneous network. Heterogeneous `-Barracuda provides a speedup
of the network by a factor of about `, as shown in the inset where the
x-axis is scaled by ∆/`.
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5.3 Polling Partial Blocktrees
The polling studied in this thesis requires syncing of the complete local block-
tree, which is redundant and unnecessarily wastes network resources. For effi-
cient bandwidth usage, we propose (`, b)-polling, where the polled nodes only
send the blocks that were generated between times t− 1 and t− b. In Figure
5.4, we compare the performance of 2-polling and (2,1),(2,3),(2,5)-polling.
The experiments suggest that comparable performance can be achieved with
a choice of b that is small. Furthermore, that choice increases with network
delay. Thus, this is an excellent algorithm to bound communication required
for polling. b needs to be adjusted according to the network delay; higher





























Figure 5.4: Sending the latest five blocks when polled is sufficient to achieve
comparable performance as sending the entire local blocktree, while
occupying significantly less network bandwidth.
5.4 Incentive Structure
To ensure a timely response from polled nodes, we propose an appropriate
incentive mechanism, motivated by those used in BitTorrent. The blockchain
P2P network involves nodes relaying blocks without any direct incentives to
send blocks to the peers. The l-polling algorithm has similar upload costs
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as block relaying and should perform well even without incentives. How-
ever, one can introduce several incentive mechanisms to make the polled
nodes send the blocks required from blocktree synchronizations. We can
take some motivation from BitTorrent; when BitTorrent nodes explore their
neighbors to get new information (this is similar to randomly choosing the
polled nodes), a reputation system is maintained, where nodes that upload
have a higher reputation, thus allowing for faster downloads. Incentive mech-
anisms for BitTorrent-like P2P networks have been analyzed to achieve Nash
equilibrium, as shown by [34]. We propose a reputation system for blockchain
polling, where a node replies to a poll request only from a proposer with a
higher reputation (tit-for-tat). A higher reputation is maintained by honestly
responding to a polling request.
Another incentive mechanism involves the proposer paying polling fees to
the polled nodes. The fees can be in the form of a conditional payment,
conditioned on the proposed block being finalized, or reaching a depth of m
blocks in the blockchain. Let Pc be the probability that block is finalized
conditioned on the polled node sending its blocktree, and Pnc be the proba-
bility that block is finalized conditioned on the polled node sending nothing.
Then the polled nodes should send its complete blocktree if:
R(Pc − Pnc) > C
where R is the polling fees/reward and C is the cost of sending blocktree
to the proposer. Note that sending the blocktree only involves sending the
difference of the blocktree of the polled node and the proposer; hence, the
cost C is relatively small. A sufficiently large fee of R ensures that the nodes
are incentivized to respond.
5.5 Security Implications
Blockchains are expected to operate in permissionless conditions, so a frac-
tion of the participants may deviate from the proposed protocol with explicit
malicious intent (of harming the critical performance metrics). It is natural
to explore potential security vulnerabilities exposed by the `-Barracuda pro-
tocol proposed in this thesis. Since push operation and poll operation are
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different network primitives and since proposer nodes perform the poll oper-
ation, nodes, when polled, ascertain who the new block’s proposer is. Such
nodes could use this information to initiate a denial of service attack on the
proposer (or launch a bribery attack involving corrupting the new block’s pro-
poser). These possibilities are similar to (but more muted than) the attacks
on the class of consensus protocols summarized under the item on “reducing
proposer diversity” in Section 1.2 (example: Bitcoin-NG), and the vulnera-
bilities are no more than those faced by this class of blockchain algorithms.
However, a simple modification to the `-Barracuda protocol nullifies even
this relatively minor vulnerability.
Consider the following network protocol design symmetric with respect to
polling: we replace push primitive and poll primitive with a single blocktree
information exchange primitive that we call “information-sync”. Each con-
nection/edge information-sync involves exchanging blocktree information in
a symmetric way between the pair of nodes. The new sync starts as soon as
the previous sync finishes. When a proposer is elected, it starts ` − 1 new
sync connections and proposes a block after completing sync from these `−1
connections. As we can see, those `−1 nodes will consider this polling request
as just another node asking for sync, allowing the poll request to hide within
the symmetrical structure. We tested this new protocol for the following
parameters: n = 500 and T = 100 for a 4-regular graph with Exp(∆) edge
synchronization delays. The performance is shown in Figure 5.5, where we
see that 5-polling offers significant gains compared to no polling. Note that
the overall gains are somewhat muted compared to the polling gains on the
pure `-Barracuda protocol setting, as expected: the symmetric network pro-
tocol already includes some polling due to the nature of the information-sync
primitive.
Polling also helps when the network is heterogeneous, as shown in Figure
5.6, which uses the same node delay distribution as the heterogeneous expo-
nential model discussed in Section 4.2. A node’s delay is defined as follows:
the average edge synchronization delay between nodes with delay ∆i and ∆j
is max(∆i,∆j) ∀i ∈ [h]. Here both the slower nodes and the faster nodes
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In this thesis, we explored the effects of network delay on block throughput;
we observe that the block throughput is severely affected by average network
delay. Inspired by this problem, we propose a Barracuda `-polling algo-
rithm for improving the block throughput in PoS blockchains by effectively
reducing the network delay by a factor of `. The algorithm has a simple
plug-and-play to the existing consensus algorithms and does not change the
underlying network properties or network hardware. Open problems like an-
alyzing adversarial attacks on Barracuda have been solved by proposing a
symmetric version of Barracuda in Chapter 5. Analyzing robustness against
an adversary for the basic Barracuda algorithm remains an open problem.
Several other practical issues like polling delay and heterogeneous networks
need further theoretical analysis. However, we show experimentally that the
observed behavior is very close to the one analyzed.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We have k = 1; we denote the proposer of block j as mj. Thus the arrival
time of the block j to node m is given by
Rj,m =
j if m = mjj +Bj,m if m 6= mj .
Here Bj,m ∼ Exp(1/∆) and are mutually independent random variables for
1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let us define an event ej,m,r as
ej,m,r =
1 when block j is proposed, node m has received block r0 otherwise .
Thus whenever node mt is chosen as a proposer for block t, the set of events
{et,mt,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ t − 1} determines the length of the longest chain Lt ,
LChain(Gt). In particular, if we denote the blocks that are part of a longest
chain Chain(Gt−1) as j1, . . . , jLt−1 , we have that




In other words, had the node mt received all the blocks that were part of
a longest chain at time t − 1, the length Lt would exceed Lt−1 by 1. Since
Lt ≥ Lt−1 with probability 1, we obtain that
E[Lt] ≥ E[Lt−1] + P [et,mt,jr = 1,∀r ∈ [Lt−1]] .
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Fix any mt ∈ [n]. If mt had not been a proposer for any of the blocks jr, we
get that
P [et,mt,jr = 1, ∀r ∈ [Lt−1]] =
Lt−1∏
r=1
(1− xt−jr), x = e
−1
∆ .
Had mt been a proposer before, clearly the above probability is still a lower
bound on P [et,mt,jr = 1, ∀r ∈ [Lt−1]]. Thus
E[Lt] ≥ E[Lt−1] +
Lt−1∏
r=1








(1− xi)) · t.
Thus is suffices to lower bound the Euler function φ(x) ,
∏∞
i=1(1−xi). Using
the inequality that x
1+x





























A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let us prove Theorem 3 with general ` ≥ 1 and then specialize it to ` = 1 to
obtain the theorem statement. Denote the chain as g, and ej,i,r[1],r[2] as ej,r[1]
since here k = 1. The event EC,t,g can be written as
EC,t,g = 1(e2,1 = 1) · 1(e3,1 = 1, e3,2 = 1)·
. . . · 1(et,1 = 1, et,2 = 1, . . . , et,t−1 = 1). (A.1)
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Let Ẽ denote the event that every node has proposed or been polled at















≤ (1− αe−`/∆)t−1. (A.5)
We now claim that if ` ≥ ∆(ln t−ln ln
1
δ )
1−∆̃ , we have E[1(EC,t,g)|Ẽ] ≥ δ − o(1).
Let c = ln 1
δ
.





























≥ e−c − o(1) (A.8)
= δ − o(1), (A.9)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that limt→∞(1− c/t)t−1 = e−c.
Conversely, we show that if ` ≤ ∆(ln t−ln ln
1
δ )
1−∆̃ , then E[1(EC,t,g)|Ẽ] ≤ δ + o(1).





E[1(EC,t,g)|Ẽ] ≤ (1− c/t)t−1 (A.10)
= e−c + o(1) (A.11)
= δ + o(1). (A.12)










Proof. Define fn(·) : N→ R as
fn(k) = (n− k) log(1−
ck
nk
)1{2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1}.
For each fixed k ∈ N, we have that limn→∞ fn(k) = 0. Our goal is to show
that limn→∞
∫
N fn(k)dµ(k) = 0 where µ(·) is the counting measure on N. In
view of dominated convergence theorem, hence it suffices to show that there
exists a g : N→ R such that
|fn(k)| ≤ g(k), k ∈ N and
∫
gdµ <∞.
Note that for 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,














where (a) follows from the fact that | log(1 − x)| ≤ x
1−x for x ∈ [0, 1]. Let




















A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Part (1). We make the following observation: if every node has only been
polled or proposed at most once, i.e., the set {m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈
[`]} contains tk` distinct nodes, then conditioned on this specific sequence
{m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [`]}, all the random variables {ej,i,l,r : j ∈ [t], i ∈
[k], l ∈ [`], r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k]} are mutually independent. Furthermore,
conditioned on this specific sequence, we have
E[ej,i,l,r|{m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [`]}, {γ(i)}
t
i=1] (A.13)
= 1− e−(γ(j)−γ(r[1])−∆̃)/∆ , (A.14)
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for all r such that r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k].
Denote the event of {m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [`]} are distinct as Ẽ. It
follows from the definition of the local attachment protocol C that
E[ej,i,l,r|Ẽ, , {γ(i)}ti=1] = 1− e−(γ(j)−γ(r[1])−∆̃)/∆ (A.15)
for all r such that r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k].
Note that the event EC,t,g = {Gt = g} only depends on {m(l)(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈
[k], l ∈ [`]} and {ej,i,r : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k]} plus some




ej,i,l,r ≥ 1, (A.16)
it follows from the independence of ej,i,l,r and Eq. (A.13) that
E[ej,i,r|Ẽ, {γ(i)}ti=1] = 1− e−(γ(j)−γ(r[1])−∆̃)`/∆ (A.17)
all r such that r[1] ∈ [j − 1], r[2] ∈ [k].
Hence, we have








, ∆̃, g, C). (A.19)
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Now we show the second part of Theorem 3. Denote byA = {g1, g2, . . . , gA}




















































Hence, we have shown that for any measurable set A that Gt or G̃t take
values in, we have




By the definition of total variation distance, we have
TV(PGt|{γ(i)}ti=1 , PG̃t) = sup
A
|P(Gt ∈ A|{γ(i)}ti=1)− P(G̃t ∈ A)|. (A.27)
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Part (2). We make the following observation: there exists some function
L({γ(i)}ti=1, ∆` , ∆̃, C) independent of all the parameters in the model such
that the expectation of the longest chain of G̃t is equal to L({γ(i)}ti=1, ∆` , ∆̃, C).
To obtain the final result, it suffices to use the variational representation of
total variation distance:
TV(P,Q) = sup
f :|f |≤ 1
2
EPf − EQf, (A.28)
and taking f = 1
t
· (LChain(Gt)− t/2).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We index all the t balls as 1, 2, . . . , t without loss of generality. Let us denote
the load of the maximally loaded bin after the placement of all balls at Lt.
We aim to find an upper bound on P (Lt ≥ k) for k ≥ C · ` · log tlog log t . It follows
from the union bound that





P (Bin j has balls (i1, i2, . . . , ik)) .
Hence, it suffices to upper bound each individual term. Note that in the
placement of each ball, the probability that a specific bin was selected as a po-





. Hence, for each k-subset (i1, i2, . . . , ik),






the union bound, we have














)n ≤ n! ≤ e√n (n
e
)n
for n ≥ 1, we have
t
(
t
k
)(
`
t
)k
≤ t e
√
ttt
(t− k)t−kkk
`k
tk
≤ et3/2
(
t
t− k
)t−k (
`
k
)k
≤ et3/2
(
1 +
k
t− k
) t−k
k
·k (
`
k
)k
≤ et3/2
(
e`
k
)k
.
We set et3/2
(
e`
k
)k ≤ 1
t
, thus,
t
(
t
k
)(
`
t
)k
≤ 1
t
.
Hence proved.
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